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The paper argues that access to public infrastructure plays a crucial role on the presence of 
private schools in a community, as it could not only minimise the cost of production, but also 
ensure a high return to private investment. Results using community, school and 
child/household-level PROBE survey data from five north Indian states provide some support 
to this central hypothesis: even after controlling for all other factors, access to village 
infrastructural facilities is associated with a higher likelihood of having a private school in the 
community. This is also corroborated by an analysis of household demand for private 
schools. The paper concludes by examining the effect of private school presence on year 5 
pass rates: while all-school pass rates are significantly higher in villages with a private 
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Investment in education is critical for economic growth and poverty alleviation. Eight out of ten 
of the world's children live in developing countries, thus posing important education policy 
challenges for the authorities in these countries. Traditionally, investment in schooling has been 
financed by the state. In an era of stagnating public budgets for education (as well as other 
accounts), private financing of education has gradually been gaining importance across the world, 
including many emerging economies. 
India is an important case in point, as the market for schooling is changing fast in 
India’s emerging economy, especially since the launch of its economic liberalisation 
programme back in 1991. While public providers traditionally dominate the supply side, 
a growing number of private providers are entering the schooling market, frequently 
giving rise to a coexistence of public and private providers in the same locality (Public 
Report On Basic Education or PROBE in short, 1999). A changing structure of the 
education market may affect the productivity/performance of schools through changing 
behaviour of market participants, namely, schools, parents and students. In this context, 
the present paper examines the factors determining the presence of and household   2
demand for private schools and also the effect of school privatization on primary school 
attainment in a sample of Indian villages, drawn from five PROBE states including Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh (MP), Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Himachal Pradesh (HP) (for 
details of the survey see Drèze and Kingdon, 2001).  
  There is a sizeable literature that identifies the effects of both demand and supply 
factors contributing to low levels of literacy in India. This literature highlights the role of 
household resources/income (Pal, 2004), gender gap in school enrolment and attainment 
attributable to low returns to female education (Kingdon, 1998), parental preferences and 
opportunity costs of schooling (Pal, 2004) as well as poor quality of state-schooling (e.g., 
see Drèze and Kingdon, 2001; Muralidharan and Kremer, 2006) including teacher’s 
absenteeism, lack of education materials, discriminatory behaviour of teachers and peers. 
In this process, the role of private fee-charging schools has largely been overlooked 
despite their growing importance over the past two decades or so. Thus one can find a 
limited number of attempts to study aspects of increasing school privatization in the 
country. For example, Bashir (1994) and Kingdon (1996) test the relative efficiency of 
public and private schooling in selected regions in India,
1 Muralidharan and Kremer 
(2006) explore the growth of private schools in major states in India while Pal and 
Kingdon (2009) examine the effect of school privatization on universal literacy in the 
Indian districts.  
                                                 
1 The literature on the effects of private schools on educational outcomes in other low-income countries is 
limited too, important exceptions being Bedi and Garg (2000), Beegle and Newhouse (2006) for Indonesia. 
There is however no consensus as to whether private schools are more efficient. A related but relatively 
new and emerging literature pertains to the growth of private tutoring in developing countries, e.g., see 
Tansel and Bircan (2006), Dang Hai-Anh (2007).  The lack of literature for developing countries in this 
respect could perhaps be attributed to the lack of available data. In contrast, there is a sizeable literature on 
the effects of private schools and school competition on educational outcomes in more developed countries, 
especially in the US.  For example, see Hoxby (1994), Epple and Romano (1998), Eide et al. (1999), Cullen 
et al. (2006).    3
The present paper goes beyond the existing literature in terms of objectives, 
methodology and therefore its results. We not only consider the factors determining the 
presence of private schools in a village, but also examine the corresponding demand for 
private schools as well as the possible effect of presence of private schools on primary 
school attainment in the sample.  
Our central argument is that given a highly unequal distribution of resources in 
India, there may be historical concentration of well-off households in some villages.
2 
These better-off households are better placed to lobby for and set up private schools, 
(especially if state schools are failing) in much the same way as they may lobby for and 
ensure access to better public roads, electricity and other infrastructural facilities in the 
communities they reside. While the role of household wealth/income and/or quality of 
local state schools for the demand for fee paying private schools needs little explanations, 
that of public infrastructure is not well-understood in this respect. This is one central 
contribution of the paper.  
The underlying argument is that access to public infrastructure is likely to lower 
the production costs of private providers and therefore could enhance the rate of return to 
private investment. Access to public infrastructure may also directly enhance the 
marginal products of both private capital and labour. The latter highlights the role of 
public capital and infrastructure on private productivity as well as rate of return to private 
investment (a la Aschauer, 1989, 1997, Barro, 1990). There may however be some 
crowding out of private investment, especially if increased investment in public capital 
and infrastructure is financed through an increase in distortionary taxes, thus lowering the 
                                                 
2The latter does not necessarily imply a high rate of migration from less developed to more developed 
villages in the state; in fact rural-to-rural migration within a state is rather low (less than 5% of the 
population) and majority of the migrants are women who move to husband’s place after marriage.   4
expected net rate of return to private investment. While the regional scientists have 
emphasized the role of investment in public infrastructure to enhance regional 
competitiveness (e.g., Vickerman, 1990), role of poor infrastructure has received 
relatively little attention to explain the lopsided development in developing countries 
(with the important exception of Reinikka and Svensson, 2002).
3 Accordingly, we argue 
that private schools are more likely to be present in more developed villages with better 
access to public infrastructure like pucca (concrete) road, piped water, electricity, phone 
and post-office. A natural corollary of this proposition is that remote villages, deprived of 
public infrastructural facilities, will also be deprived of access to private schools. 
Second, we examine the factors determining the household demand for private 
schools in the sample villages and in doing so, we not only include household 
characteristics (e.g., parental education, religion, family composition), but also 
characteristics of local state schools (pupils per teacher, teachers’ attendance rate) as well 
as village infrastructural development index; the latter is included with a view to assess 
the role of village infrastructure on demand for private schools, among other factors. 
Finally, we examine the effect of private school presence on school attainment in 
the sample villages, where attainment at the village-level has been measured by the pass 
rates (i.e., percentage of students passing) in class V examination. This is a general test of 
Mathematics and English conducted by the state primary school board taken at the end of 
the primary level (i.e., year 5) by students in recognized schools (government and private 
unaided) in the sample. In particular, we first assess the effect of private school presence 
on average government school pass rates in a given village. The underlying hypothesis is 
                                                 
3 There is however a growing literature on the provision of public services like health and education in 
developing countries (e.g., Chaudhury et al. 2005).   5
whether competition from newly emerging private schools in a village improves class-V 
pass rates in the local government schools, as they compete for the same pool of children. 
We also assess the effect of private school presence on pooled class V pass rates for all 
schools at the village-level.  The latter relates to our argument that presence of private 
schools in a village is driven by presence of better-off (e.g., more educated) households 
as well as better infrastructural development, which in turn may boost schooling 
attainment in these villages. 
In terms of methodology, an important concern of the paper is to minimize the 
potential endogeneity bias of our estimates. In particular, one may raise concerns about 
the endogeneity of village infrastructural facilities in the determination of access to 
private schools as well as demand for private schools, both of which are central to our 
analysis. In an attempt to find an exogenous instrument of village infrastructure, we first 
compute an weighted average of access to various public infrastructure in a village 
including access to pucca road, electricity, phone, piped water, and post-office, using 
principal component analysis. Subsequently, following the recent political economy 
literature (e.g., see Pal and Ghosh, 2008), we determine a village’s access to this 
composite measure of village infrastructure, using distribution of land and ethnic 
heterogeneity in the locality (see section 2.3). Predicted value of this composite 
infrastructural index has been used as a potentially exogenous instrument of village-level 
infrastructural facilities; this is ensured by predicting this variable using variables, which 
are not included in the determination of presence of private school in a village (section 
3.1) or household demand for private schools (see sections 3.2).   6
Results using the child/household-, school- and village-level PROBE data-set 
provide some support to our central hypotheses. First, more ethnically diverse villages 
have less public infrastructure; however, more unequal villages (i.e., those with higher 
standard deviation of landholding) would have more public infrastructure, even if they 
are ethnically more diverse. Second, private schools are more likely to be present in 
villages closer to the district head quarters and with access to better infrastructural 
facilities and also where government school teachers’ absence rate is low. Third, after 
controlling for various household and individual characteristics, a sample household is 
likely to send a child to local private schools if the household resides in villages with 
better access to public infrastructure and also if the quality of local state schools is poor.  
Finally, presence of private school has a significant positive impact on village-level all-
school (pooled) class V pass rates while it fails to have a significant impact on village 
government school class V pass rates. In other words, there is no evidence that presence 
of private schools boost attainment of local government schools in our sample. 
 The analysis is developed as follows. Section 2 discusses the data while section 3 
explains the hypotheses and methodology. Section 4 presents and analyses the results and 
the final section concludes. 
 
 
2. Data Description 
One important reason for the lack of research on public and private schools in India (as 
well as other developing countries) has been the scarcity of appropriate school-, village- 
and/or district-level data for both private and public schools from across the country.   7
Among the existing studies, Bashir (1994) studied the case of Tamil Nadu while Kingdon 
(1996) focused on urban UP. Muralidharan and Kremer (2006) have used their own 
survey data to examine the rise of private schools across a sample of major Indian states. 
One could in principle try to use the recently released district-level Seventh round of All 
India School Education Survey (AISES) data collected in 2002-03. There are however 
some serious shortcomings of this data-set for our purpose: first, the survey focuses on 
collecting very detailed inputs from schools under different management (government, 
private aided, private unaided, local body etc.), but does not have any information on 
attendance or attainment of students. Second, AISES data only focuses on recognized 
schools in India while a large number of new private schools in the Indian states remain 
unrecognized (e.g., see Table 2). Finally, AISES data do not have any information on 
household characteristics of children studying in schools under different types of 
management.  
In the absence of any better alternative source, the present paper makes use of the 
school- village- and child/household-level information obtained from the PROBE survey 
data (for details of the data, see Dréze and Kingdon, 2001) collected during September to 
December 1996. Although somewhat dated, this data covers households, schools and 
villages drawn from five Indian states including four of the country’s worst performing 
states, namely, Bihar, MP, Rajasthan and UP; the fifth state is a much better-off state 
Himachal Pradesh (HP). The sample of schools in the PROBE survey includes both 
recognized and non-recognised schools under different management. Although the 
sample size is small, the amount of information we have for the schools (various inputs as 
well as indicator of performance), child/households and villages is quite unique and not   8
generally available in any other existing surveys. Moreover, this sample focuses on some 
of the worst performing states and the coexistence of private and state schools in our 
sample gives us an opportunity to study the objectives of our interest that remain rather 
unexplored not only in the Indian context, but also any other emerging economy. We not 
only use the school and village-level data, but also make use of the household-level data 
collected from 123 sample villages
4 (part of the PROBE data used by Dréze and 
Kingdon, 2001).  
  There are 290 schools surveyed across five sample states. Among these 290 
schools, 45 schools (i.e., 16%) were private unaided schools
5, which include both private 
recognised (36%) and uncrecognised (64%) schools with a primary section attached to 
it.
6 Hindi or Urdu has been the medium of instruction in about 90% of these sample 
schools under private management; less than 5% of these schools used English as the 
medium of instruction.
7 Thus unlike some existing literature (e.g., Munshi and 
Rosenzweig, 2006), the medium of instruction was not significantly different between 
private and government schools included in the PROBE survey. All state and private 
schools in our sample catered to primary education.  
  Table 1 shows the distribution of state and private schools across the villages in 
the selected states. Clearly, public providers dominated the schooling market in that as 
high as 80% of the sample villages had only state-run schools (the proportion ranges 
between 75% in UP to 92% in MP). In contrast, the corresponding proportion of villages 
                                                 
4 Note that the total number of schools in the school data-set is 290 while the number falls to 170 when we 
consider 123 sample villages from which household data was collected in the PROBE survey (see column 2 
of Table 1). Information was collected from about 4500 children belonging to 1322 households residing in 
123 sample villages in the PROBE states. 
5 This excludes the private schools receiving aid from the government. 
6 All private and state schools in the PROBE survey provided primary education, which is the focus of our 
analysis in this paper. 
7 PROBE survey does not however allow us to identify religious PUA schools from others.   9
with private (recognised or unrecognised) schools is much lower
8 and in most cases 
private schools tend to be set up in a village with existing state-run schools. 
Table 2 highlights the significant variation in the rate of privatisation across the 
PROBE states. While 28% of UP villages has private schools with primary section, it was 
only 8% in MP in 1996. If however we compare these proportions with those observed by 
Muralidharan and Kremer (2006), the growth rate of privatisation over a period of 1996-
2002/03 appears to be dramatic in UP, Bihar and Rajasthan and MP; the rate of increase 
has however been rather modest in the more prosperous state of HP. Finally, the 
privatisation rate appears to be much smaller if we consider the figures obtained from 7
th 
AISES for these PROBE states over the same period; the difference is largely attributed 
to the fact that AISES data have focused only on recognised schools. Thus a much higher 
proportion of private schools in the Indian states, especially those in the worse-
performing PROBE states, tend to be unrecognised and the difference is particularly 
striking for the state of Bihar. The latter further justifies our attempt to use the PROBE 
data that includes information on both recognised and unrecognised schools in the 
selected states.  
 
 
2.1. Comparison of Public and Private Schools 
The existing literature highlights the differential characteristics of state and private 
schools with respect to both school inputs and indicators of school 
performance/attainment. Table 3 summarises the differences between state and private 
                                                 
8 Also note that the number of private schools will be one in almost all cases, if at all.    10
schools in our sample not only in school inputs, but also in school performance. Among 
possible performance indicators, we have information on class five pass rates, i.e., the 
proportion of class v students passing the end of year test in a given type of school 
(government or private unaided). The table also shows the corresponding t-statistics for 
mean differences in a set of selected characteristics of these two schools, when 
significant. There are significant differences in the input choice; for example, private 
school teachers are often younger and have more education, but often do not have any 
teacher’s training.
9 These two groups of schools are also significantly different with 
respect to average enrolment (i.e., average number of students at the primary level), 
pupil-teacher ratio as well as pass rates in the class V (taken at the end of the primary 
level). In particular, average enrolment as well as pupils per teacher is significantly 
higher while pass rates are significantly lower in state schools. 
 
2.2. Comparison of villages with/without private school 
We also compare the demographic, socio-economic and school characteristics of the 
villages with and without private schools, which in turn highlights if there is any 
systematic difference between these two groups of villages. Results of a simple mean test 
summarised in Table 4 indicate that villages with private schools tend to enjoy better 
infrastructural facilities, as reflected in their access to piped water, electricity, phone, post 
office etc. These villages are also significantly closer to the pucca road as well as the 
district head quarters. Second, villages with private schools tend to be larger (in terms of 
population) and have relatively more educated parents. These villages also have lower 
                                                 
9 Kingdon (1996) suggests that annual per pupil salaries of private school teachers were significantly lower 
than those spent on teachers in government or private aided schools. The latter seems to be compatible with 
their profit maximisation motive of private schools.   11
proportion of low caste and Muslim population, who are often poorer and also have less 
assets. In other words, private schools are more likely to be present in villages with 
better-off households and better public infrastructure. Finally we consider class 5 pass 
rates as a useful indicator of quality/attainment of primary education at the village level. 
Clearly, pass rates in class V examination taken at the end of the year are significantly 
higher in the villages with private schools. 
Note however that an overwhelming majority of private schools in our sample 
prevails in the villages with at least one state school. Presence of private schools in 
sample villages could thus offer more choice for parents, especially those who are not 
budget constrained. The natural hypothesis to test would therefore be whether the 
presence of private schools improves the school attainment in a village (in comparison to 
that without a private school), in general, and also the attainment of village states schools, 
in particular. This is discussed in section 3.3. 
 
2.3. Access to public infrastructure 
As already indicated, access to village-level public infrastructural facilities plays a central 
role in our analysis. We observe if the village has access to piped water, electricity, phone 
and post office. We also know the distance of the village from the nearest pucca road and 
the district head quarter. Table 2 compares the average village-level public infrastructural 
facilities in the PROBE data, among others, in the sample states and highlights the extent 
of inter-state variation in this respect. On an average, villages in HP are more developed 
with better access to public infrastructural facilities. In contrast, the remaining four states 
lie at the other end of the distribution not only in terms of access to many public   12
infrastructural facilities, but also in terms of average per capita state domestic product.  
  Using principal component analysis, we construct a composite village 
infrastructural development index, which is a weighted average (Bartlett score) of the 
village’s access to piped water, electricity, phone and post office. The question that may 
however arise at this point is whether one can treat access to public infrastructure in a 
village to be purely exogenous. In fact there is now a growing political economy 
literature on public goods provision in the low-income countries, which identifies ethnic 
fractionalisation and elite dominance as two crucial factors determining access to 
infrastructure. In general, there is confirmation from the Indian districts that more 
heterogeneous communities tend to be politically weaker and therefore are less likely to 
get the goods they want and more likely to get some of the inferior substitutes (e.g., see 
Banerjee and Somnathan, 2007). Second, following Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) and 
Galor and Moav (2006), we examine the role of land distribution on a village’s access to 
public infrastructure in India. The underlying idea is that presence of a landed elite may 
influence provision of public infrastructure; presence of a landed elite is measured here 
by the standard deviation (as a measure of inequality) in the distribution of land. 
Accordingly, we determine the composite index of village-level public infrastructure in 
terms of village land distribution (mean and standard deviation) and an index of ethnic 
fractionalisation (defined as one minus the sum of square of population shares belonging 
to various caste/religion groups in the village). We also include an interaction between 
land inequality index and ethnic frationalisation  in our analysis.  
OLS estimates of village infrastructural index summarised in Table 5 do suggest 
that more ethnically diverse villages have less public infrastructure; while land inequality   13
index is not significant on its own, the interaction term between land inequality index and 
ethnic heterogeneity index is. Thus more unequal villages (i.e., those with higher standard 
deviation of landholding) would have more public infrastructure, even if they are 
ethnically more diverse. These ordinary least square (ols) coefficients naturally estimate 
the marginal effects of the relevant variables. Given that the index of land inequality is 
not significant, the total effect of land inequality in our sample could be calculated as 
0.11*0.28= 0.0308, if the value of ethnic heterogeneity is held at its mean level.
 10  Taken 
together, there is some confirmation that villages with more unequal landholding tend to 
have better access to public infrastructure. Accordingly we could use the predicted value 
of composite village infrastructural index as an instrument of infrastructure in estimating 
equations (1) and (2), provided we satisfy some exclusion restriction (see further 
discussion in section 3).  
 
 
3. Hypotheses and Methodology 
This section formalises our hypotheses and methodology for the empirical analysis.  
 
3.1. Presence of private schools  
Given that only about 16% of the sample villages in the PROBE survey had a private 
school, an important question would be to examine what determines the presence of 
private schools. Note however that there has been a single private school, if at all, which 
                                                 
10 So the total effect of land inequality in the sample is being dominated by the indirect effect of land 
inequality through the interaction term with ethnic heterogeneity; we could thus ignore the insignificant 
direct effect of land inequality.     14
in turn induces us to empirically determine a binary variable PRIVS (rather than the 
number of private schools in a village) that takes a value 1 if there is a private school in 
the village and zero otherwise. 
11 
There are some underlying assumptions that we need to clarify here. First, it is 
assumed here that most private schools are recently established (for example, see 
Muralidharan and Kremer, 2006), i.e., state schools were established before the private 
schools.
12 Second, we assume that the provision of state education is exogenous 
(determined, e.g., by government policies). Accordingly, we determine the likelihood of 
having a private school in a village v located in the s-th state ܲ ௩௦ as follows:  
ܲ ௩௦ ൌܺ Ԣ ௩௦ߚ൅ߜ ௦ ൅ߝ ௩௦  (1) 
where Xvs includes the set of village-specific explanatory variables in a given state s. 
The set of explanatory variables X could account for the structure of existing 
schooling market as well as the access to public infrastructure in the village. First, we 
argue that the structure of the existing schooling market can be captured by the 
characteristics of existing state schools. In this respect, we include teachers’ attendance 
rate, absence of the head teacher (a binary variable) in the final specification.
13 Second, 
public infrastructure is largely location specific, location choice of private firms, 
especially the smaller ones, may thus follow the location of public infrastructure, thus 
minimizing some sunk costs of production. Our analysis in this respect highlights the 
                                                 
11 The reference category is the government schools, which include both government and private aided 
schools. These two types of schools are similar in many respects with both being entirely financed by the 
government and having little/no control over staffing (hiring/firing), curricula, teaching materials and 
budget allocation. The main difference between these two types of schools is that the latter are nominally 
privately managed, though there could be some inter-state variation in the management of PA schools. 
Private schools here refer to unaided (recognised and unrecognised included) schools. 
12 We however do not observe the year a school was founded. 
13 We experiment with a number of other characteristics of the existing state schools including multi-grade 
teaching, number of infrastructural facilities available, pupil teacher ratio. Results shown in Table 6 
represent the estimates of the parsimonious specification.   15
potential role of composite village-level public infrastructural index (obtained from the 
first principal component) that we have computed in section 2.3. In addition, we include 
the distance of the village from the nearest pucca road and also the district head quarter. 
In addition to enhancing the rate of return to private investment, a village’s access to 
public infrastructure could also capture the strength of demand for private schools as 
better off villages with better access to public infrastructure tend to be inhabited by better 
off households, who are more likely to send their children to private schools. This is also 
reflected in the determination of composite index of village infrastructure in section 2.3. 
However, one could argue that village’s public infrastructure is potentially 
endogenous to determining village’s access to private school; this is because better-off 
households may lobby for and set up private school in much the same way as they may 
lobby for better public roads, electricity etc. Thus village’s access to public infrastructure 
is likely to be correlated with the error term of equation (1) determining the presence of 
private schools in the village. In the absence of a better alternative, we use the predicted 
value of the composite village infrastructural index as an instrument (see section 2.3). 
This is because the predicted value of the variable (access to public infrastructure) is 
closely correlated with the actual variable while its correlation with the error term of 
equation (1) would be minimized since a  village’s access to  public infrastructure has 
been predicted by ethnic diversity and inequality in the distribution of landholding (see 
discussion in section 2) and none of these variables have been included to determine 
either the presence of a private school (see equation 1).  
There may however remain a number of unobservable factors that may influence 
the presence of a private school in a village. Our estimates are likely to be biased, if these   16
are not accounted for. In particular, economic prosperity of the state may be an important 
factor influencing both the demand for (e.g., through its effect on fertility) and the supply 
of (e.g., government spending on state schools) private schools in the state; to this end, 
we include state-level fixed effects δs as additional controls. So long as the unobservables 
are state-specific, inclusion of state controls would minimise the potential bias of our 
estimates.   
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable PRIVS, we use a binary probit 
model to determine the presence of private schools in the market. Table 6 shows the 
coefficient estimates (as well as the corresponding marginal effects) of two 
specifications: specification (1) includes only village-level characteristics while 
specification (2) includes selected characteristics of state schools as well. In both cases 
we control for state-level prosperity. 
 
3.2. Household demand for private schools 
A related question is to analyse whether the presence of private school in a locality has 
been a response to the corresponding demand for private schools in the local schooling 
market. In this respect, we analyse the parental choice of private schools (as against state 
schools) in the sample villages. The latter will be determined, among others, by the 
characteristics of individual child and its siblings, parental income/education as well as 
caste/religion
14, quality of local state schools (as reflected in teaching as well as 
infrastructural facilities offered) as well as the community infrastructural facilities. To 
this end, we determine the likelihood that a local household sends a child i to a private 
                                                 
14 Note that in the light of our discussion in section 3.1., we also assess the robustness of our results in 
terms of alternative instruments.    17





ௗ ൌߙ ܺ ௜௩௦
ᇱ ൅ߛ ܼ ௩௦
ᇱ ൅׎ ௦ ൅ߝ ௜௩௦     (2) 
The set of explanatory variables X includes the individual/household characteristics of 
the child (gender, age), characteristics of his/her siblings (proportion of younger male and 
female children aged below 18 years), his/her parents (education, caste/religion) living in 
a village v in state s. We also include the non-household characteristics Z of state 
school(s) (e.g., pupil per teacher, proportion of teachers present and also the number of 
infrastructural facilities available) in a village as well as the composite infrastructural 
index (predicted)
16 of the village. The underlying idea is that for given values of other 
variables, parental choice of private schools could be a response to the characteristics of 
local state schools and/or local village infrastructural index.  Finally, we include the state 
level fixed effects s to control for the unobserved state-level factors, e.g., state domestic 
product (sdp), fertility rate etc.  (e.g., see Table 3), affecting the relationship.  
Note that the identifying variables in the two probit equations (ever-enrolment and 
parental choice of private schools) are village infrastructural index (predicted) and the 
sibling composition variables, i.e., the proportion of younger male and female children 
aged between 5-18 years. Given that access to a state school in a village is determined by 
government policy, we argue that village level infrastructural index is relevant in the 
parental choice of private schools only and not in the decision for ever-enrolment. 
Similarly, the proportion of younger male and female children aged 5-18 in a household 
                                                 
15 Note that we use different notation  P
d
ivs to indicate  the household choice of private schools and 
distinguish it from the presence of a private school Pvs discussed in section 3.1. 
16 We continue to use the predicted value of the infrastructural index as this would minimise the potential 
simultaneity bias.   18
would highlight the household resource constraint effect, if any, and as such would be 
important only in the parental choice of fee-paying private schools. 
Given that a significant proportion of sample children are never enrolled
17, 
derivation of the demand for private school P
d
ivs needs to account for the possibility of 
ever-enrolment. Using PROBE household-level data, we therefore use a simultaneous 
probit model to jointly determine the likelihood of ever-enrolment (a binary variable) and 
also whether a child attends a private school (a second binary variable). An alternative 
would be to use a bivariate probit model of parental choice of private school with 
selection for ever-enrolled children. Note however that the main difference between a 
simultaneous probit model and bivariate probit model with selection is that the latter 
assumes a sequential decision process (parents first decide whether to enrol a child and 
then selecting the enrolled children decides whether to send an ever-enrolled child to a 
private school). One could however argue that these two decisions are determined 
simultaneously and not sequentially. Thus a multivariate simultaneous probit may be 
more pertinent in this context. These results are presented and discussed in section 4.2. In 
order to check the robustness, we compare these simultaneous probit estimates with 
corresponding bivariate probit estimates with selection for ever-enrolment.
18 
 
3.3. Effects of School Choice on School Attainment 
It is natural to argue that the presence of private schools would affect school attainment 
through strategic response(s) of state schools. There is some literature on the game 
                                                 
17 Note that a significantly larger proportion of boys (60% as opposed to 40% of girls) are ever-enrolled in 
our sample while a larger proportion of ever-enrolled girls (19.6% as opposed to 15.6% of boys) go to 
private schools. If however we consider the proportion of total boys and girls going to private schools, the 
proportion is very similar (around 11% for both boys and girls). 
18 Appendix Table A1 shows the probit estimates of ever-enrolment in our sample.   19
theoretic models of mixed duopoly/oligopoly where at least one public firm may coexist 
with at least one private firm (e.g., see Ware, 1986); each type of firms has different 
objective functions though it is unclear as to how an incumbent government school would 
respond to the entry of a private school in the locality. Along these lines, one could 
examine whether the presence of private schools have any impact on school attainment 
measured by the pass rates of the local state school(s). If not, it can be concluded that the 
element of competition seems to be absent among the government schools in our sample, 
who tend to enjoy a secure source of funding in India, largely independent of school 
performance.  
Second, in view of Table 4, it is expected that villages with private schools would 
experience differential pass rates (relative to villages without private schools).Thus a 
related issue is to examine the possible effect of school type (private unaided and others) 
on the overall class V pass rates (for state and private schools pooled together) in the 
village, if any. The underlying argument is that the presence of better-off households 
(more educated and non-Muslim households, as highlighted in Table 4) and more public 
infrastructure could contribute to higher primary pass rates in villages with private 
schools.  
Accordingly, we argue that school attainment is a function of school type which 
in turn depends on school inputs. Accordingly, we determine (a) average class V pass 
rates Qvs (pooling both state and private schools together) in village v located in state s 
and also (b) average class V pass rates Qgvs of the state school(s) in village v located in 
state s.
 19  
                                                 
19 We also tried to use pupil-teacher ratio PTR as an alternative indicator of school quality. Some may 
however argue that PTR is not a good indicator of school quality in this context as presence of both private   20
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vs vs s vs







       (3) 
where Pvs is a binary variable indicating the presence of a private school in the village 
while  s denotes the control for state-specific fixed effects. Note however that the 
presence of a private school in a village v in state s is a choice variable emerging from 
equation (1); therefore simple OLS estimates of (3) are going to be biased. In the absence 
of any better instrument, we generate the predicted value of Pvs using the probit estimates 
equation (2) (shown in Table 6) and use this predicted value as a possible instrument in a 
2SLS estimate. Given that there are some identifying variables, e.g., characteristics of 
state schools and also those of the village, which are only included in the determination 
of presence of private schools Pvs from equation (1) but not in the determination of school 
attainment in set of equations (3), it is expected that the correlation between predicted 
presence of private school derived from equation (1) and the error terms in the set of 
equations (3) could be minimised when we consider 2SLS estimates.  
Nevertheless, our ability to generate the best possible instruments is limited by the 
fact that we only have access to a single (and not repeated) cross-section data. It is thus 
possible that the difference in the 2SLS and the corresponding OLS estimates could 
reflect the measurement errors in the instruments used. It can however be argued here that 
if private schools tend to locate in places where unobserved parents' tastes/preferences for 
education are higher, we are likely to overestimate the impact of private schools on 
educational outcomes; in this case the estimates obtained would be an upper bound of the 
true effect. Similarly, if competition from private schools causes public schools to 
                                                                                                                                                   
and state schools in a village would naturally be accompanied by lower PTR relative to villages with one 
type of school. Accordingly we choose class V pass rates to be a more appropriate indicator of school 
quality.    21
increase their quality, the impact of the presence of private schools on public school 
quality is likely to be overestimated. OLS and 2SLS estimates of the set of equations (3) 





This section describes and analyses the estimates of presence of private schools equation 
(1) (see section 4.1), household choice of private schools equation (2) (see section 4.2) 
and effect of private school presence on primary pass rates equations (3) (see section 4.3).  
 
4.1. Presence of private schools  
State-fixed effects probit maximum likelihood estimates of the presence of private school 
equation (1) are shown in Table 6. Since probit estimates do not correspond to the 
marginal effects, we also show the corresponding marginal effects for each explanatory 
variable. We have estimates using specifications (1) and (2). While specification (1) 
includes only the village characteristics (e.g., location of the village, infrastructural 
development of the villages), specification (2) includes characteristics of village 
government schools (e.g., attendance of school head and other assistant teachers) as well. 
Given that the goodness of fit reflected in the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic is 
significantly higher for specification (2), our discussion is couched here in terms of the 
estimates of specification (2).  
There is evidence that the likelihood of private school presence in a village is   22
significantly influenced by the characteristics of local state-run schools.
20 In particular, 
presence of both the head and assistant teachers matter a lot; in fact, the likelihood of 
private school presence is significantly higher if the attendance of head and other teachers 
in the local government school is lower. This provides some support to the hypothesis 
that after controlling for all other factors, private school is more likely to be present in the 
village with poorly functioning state-run schools (e.g., see Muralidharan and Kremer, 
2006). 
More interestingly, these results highlight the importance of public infrastructure 
(predicted) on private school presence in the sample villages, something that has never 
been examined in the Indian context. There is suggestion that even after controlling for 
other factors, village-development index (comprised of the village’s access to electricity, 
piped water, phone and post-office) plays a significant role – more developed villages 
with access to these public infrastructural facilities are significantly more likely to have a 
private school; the latter is likely to be compatible with a higher rate of return on private 
investment, which in turn provides some support to the public capital hypothesis. In 
addition, private schools are more likely to be present in villages closer to pucca road and 
district head quarter. 
 
4.2. Household demand for private schools 
Table 7 summarises the estimates of equation (2) that parents send a child to a private 
school in the village. We show three sets of estimates here: column (1) shows the 
uncorrected univariate probit estimates of the likelihood that parents send a child to a 
                                                 
20 We also tried to include the number of existing state schools in each village though it was never 
significant in any specification; this is perhaps because of the lack of variation in the variable across the 
sample villages.   23
private school; these estimates are however likely to be biased as it does not correct for 
the probability of ever-enrolment. Columns (2) and (3) respectively show the 
simultaneous and bivariate (sequential) probit estimates of parental choice of private 
schools; while the simultaneous probit estimates jointly determine the possibility of ever-
enrolment and choice of private school, bivariate probit estimates with selection correct 
for the selectivity bias that the child has ever been enrolled (estimates of ever-enrolment 
are shown in Appendix Table A1). While correlation coefficients in both simultaneous 
and bivariate probit models are significant, there are evidence of some mis-specification 
in the bivariate estimates; in particular, the positive coefficient estimate of pupil-teacher 
ratio or negative coefficient of teacher’s attendance rate appears to be counter-intuitive; 
the latter may be a result of treating enrolment and private school choice as sequential 
rather than simultaneous.   
Therefore, our discussion in this subsection is couched in terms of the 
simultaneous probit estimates shown in column (2) of parental choice of private schools. 
In general, gender of the child is important; while boys are less likely to go to a private 
school (note that this is significant only at 10% level; also see footnote 17), boys from 
families with higher proportion of female children (aged less than 18) are more likely to 
go to a private school in our sample. Many of the household, local state schools and 
village infrastructure characteristics are significant too. First, there is suggestion that the 
likelihood of private schooling is significantly higher for children born to more educated 
parents and also for those belonging to non-Muslim households.
21 In a sense, parental 
education and caste/religion in India can be taken to be good measures of wealth in India. 
                                                 
21 In fact Table 4 suggests that there is no low caste or Muslim households who send their children to 
private school.   24
There is thus suggestion that children from better off families
22 are more likely to attend 
fee-paying private schools, which is naturally to be expected for the choice of fee-paying 
schools. Secondly, instrument of village composite infrastructural facilities is positive 
and highly significant, thus indicating a higher demand for private schools from 
households residing in more developed village s  w i t h  a c c e s s  t o  m o r e  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  
facilities. As argued earlier, the latter could be taken as a measure of wealth effect as 
well, as better off households tend to live in better off villages with better access to public 
infrastructure. This result corresponds to the similar result for equation (1) (see Table 6). 
Finally, ceteris paribus, estimates of equation (2) further corroborate the estimates of 
equation (1) presented in section 4.1 in that the household demand for private schools is 
significantly related to the quality of local government schools. In particular, parents are 
more likely to send their children to private schools when pupil-teacher ratio is higher 
and teacher’s attendance rate is lower in the local state schools, thus indirectly revealing 
their preferences for better schooling services provided by private schools. School’s 
physical infrastructure however remains statistically insignificant. 
 
4.3. Estimates of school attainment 
Finally we consider estimates of equations (3) highlighting the effects of private school 
presence on class V pass rates in Government school and also the village-specific class V 
pass rates as shown in Table 8. For each variable, two sets of estimates are produced: 
simple ols estimates and 2sls estimates, where the instrument for private school presence 
is nothing but the predicted value of private school presence derived from probit 
                                                 
22 We also tried including household landholding as an additional explanatory variable though it was never 
significant in any specification. That is why we dropped it from the final specification. Note however that 
we do not observe household income or expenditure.    25
estimates of equation (1) shown in Table 6. We argue that the instrumented 2SLS 
estimates are better than the corresponding ols estimates as the former minimises the 
estimation bias arising from the inclusion of a potential endogenous variable. 
Accordingly, our discussion below is couched in terms of the 2SLS estimates only. 
Private school presence does not seem to have any significant effect on 
government school pass rates (see column 2, Table 8), but has a significant effect on 
village-level pass rates (see column 4, Table 8). Further, marginal effects of private 
school presence on village pass rates are higher if we consider the 2SLS (rather than ols) 
estimates.  
  Despite our best efforts to minimise possible biases due to unobserved 
heterogeneity and simultaneity, one needs to interpret these estimates cautiously. First, 
use of single cross-section PROBE data means that we cannot control for the possible 
correlation between infrastructural development and some unobserved determinants of 
pass rates over time. In particular, one is likely to over-estimate the impact of private 
school on village-level pass rates as private schools tend to be present in places where 





5. Concluding Comments 
In an era of increasing school privatisation around the globe including many emerging 
countries, it is important to understand the nature and consequences of school 
privatisation. India is an important case in point, as public providers in the country are 
increasingly being challenged by a growing number of private providers though relatively   26
little is known in this respect. The present paper is a first attempt to bridge this important 
gap of the literature.  
Results from the PROBE villages in India offer some interesting insights and 
highlight the role of village-level public infrastructure (as reflected in the access to 
concrete road, electricity, piped water, phone and post office), among other things, on 
both supply and demand for private schools. Given the possible endogeneity of 
infrastructural development in a village in the determination of presence of private 
schools, we generate an instrument using the inequality in the distribution of landholding 
and ethnic fractionalisation index in the village, which are not included in the 
determination of private school presence. After controlling for all possible factors, there 
is evidence that private schools are more likely to be present in villages with more 
infrastructural facilities and poor quality of public schools. These findings are also 
corroborated by an analysis of household demand for private schools. The essential 
implication is that villages distant from the district head quarter and motorable road 
would continue to remain deprived of essential public and private facilities, especially if 
they are unable to organise powerful collective action. The process of development would 
remain lopsided until and unless the responsible authorities target these disadvantaged 
areas for the provision of essential public infrastructure. 
While emergence of private schools fails to have a perceptible effect on 
government school pass rates in our sample, it is associated with a significantly higher 
village-level pass rates. In the absence of any strategic response from existing state 
schools to private entry, higher pass rates in villages with private schools are likely to be 
driven by choice of differential school inputs, which in turn highlight the roles of village   27
demographics, wealth distribution as well as access to public infrastructure all of which 
seem to be closely intertwined. One however needs to interpret these estimates cautiously 
because of the problems of unobserved time-varying heterogeneity and reverse causality 
in our analysis using single cross-section data. This is an issue that remains little 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Distribution of state and private schools across sample states 
 
  % of villages  
  (1) PROBE school survey  (2) PROBE sample villages 



































8 95 5 
 
Note: There are 290 schools in the PROBE school survey while there are 170 schools in 
123 sample villages from which child/household information was also collected in the 
PROBE survey. Note that sum total of 1(a) and (b) or 2(a) and (b) may not be 100, as 
there may be a minority of villages in some states with private schools only.   31
Table 2. An Inter-state comparison of selected characteristics  
 
Averages UP  Bihar  MP  Rajasthan  HP 
Enrollment 145  157  127  146  93 
Pupil-Teacher 
Ratio 




34 36 38 37 24 








1.17 0.75 1.35 1.43 3.19 
Low caste 
households(%) 
55 76 80 47 63 
Muslim 
households(%) 
17  11  1 6 3 
Per capita sdp, 
1996 
6713 4231 7571 8974  10583 
Total fertility 
rate, 1991[2] 




35.8 31.9 35.7 34.4 27.9 
% of villages 
with a private 
schools, 1996 
28 20  8  14 11 
% of villages 
with no school 
[3] 
26 15 14 19 5.2 
% of villages 
with private 
schools [3] 
26.1 1 18.2  26.2  5.8 




57 54 23 52 15 
 
Note: Most information are gathered from PROBE survey (1999) unless otherwise stated. 
PROBE information relates to the schools and households in the sample villages only. [1] This is 
a composite index comprising of the village’s access to piped water, electricity, phone and post-
office, obtained using principal component analysis. [2] Total fertility rate is obtained from 1991 
Census data; birth rate for 1990-92 is obtained from NFHS 1992-93. [3] Source: AISES 7
th round 
2002-03. [4] Source: Muralidharan and Kremer (2006); Note that AISES data focuses on 
recognised schools only while PROBE and Muralidharan and Kremer consider both recognised 
and unrecognised schools.    32
Table 3. Comparison of private and state schools 
 
School characteristics  Private school  State school  T-statistics  
(equal variances 
are not assumed)  
Teacher does multi-
grade teaching (%) 
72 73 - 
No of school 
infrastructural facilities 
[1] 
5.8 4.8 3.245** 
Principal absent (%)  18 33 -2.411* 
Teacher’s attendance 
rate (%) 
81 81  
Female teachers (%)  23 21 - 
Hardcore punisher (%)  89 84 - 
Teacher’s education 
(years) 
13.5 13  - 
Teacher’s age (years)  28 38 -5.099** 
Class 1 teacher lives in 
the same village (%) 
69 27 5.533** 
Teachers with pre-
service training (%) 
18 67 -7.437** 
Teachers with in-service  
training (%) 
11 54 -7.288** 
Enrolment  108 144 -2.439* 
Pupil teacher ratio  24.5 47.6 -9.228** 
Pass rate in class V 
board exam (%)[2] 
99.2 94.3 4.759** 
 
Note: T-statistic is shown only when the statistic is significant. ‘*’ denotes significance at 
5% while ‘**’ denotes that at 1% or lower level. [1] It is a composite index of functional 
school infrastructural facilities that includes access to drinking water, toilet, electricity, 
fan, playground, blackboard etc. [2] Class V pass rate is defined as the percentage of total 
students in class 5 passing the examination at the end of the year. 
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Villages with a 
private school 





Pupil per teacher  48.38  44.89  0.830 
Class V pass rates  92.3  80.8  2.547* 
Population > 1000 (%)  50  21  14.446** 
Male education (years)  6.497  5.080  15.857** 
Female education (years)  2.266  1.158  15.533** 
Low caste households (%)  58  63  -4.928 ** 
Muslim households (%)  5  11  -10.155 ** 
Access to piped water (%)  33  15  9.776 ** 
Access to phone (%)  52  20  16.079** 
Access to Post Office (%)  47  24  11.850 ** 
Average distance from pucca 
road (km) 
1.6 3.6  -20.663  ** 
Average distance from 
district HQ (km) 
3.2 8.5  -30.105** 
Composite village 
infrastructural index 
0.69 -0.02  17.067** 
Mean landholding  3.8  3.1  6.674** 
SD of landholding  3.8  3.3  4.051** 
Ethnic fractionalisation  0.62  0.73  -12.698** 
 
Note: ‘*’ denotes significance at 5% while ‘**’ denotes that at 1% or lower level. These 
statistics are based on the information obtained from the sample villages only. There were 
1322 households and 170 schools in 123 sample villages. Composite infrastructural index 
is the first principal component of the village’s access to piped water, electricity, phone 
and post office. Index of ethnic fractionalisation is given by 1-∑p
2
i, where pi is the 
population proportion of upper caste Hindu, SC, ST and Muslim living in each village.  
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Table 5. OLS estimates of village infrastructural development index 
 
 Coefficient  T-stat 
Ethnic heterogeneity  -0.07  4.752** 
Mean landholding  -0.03  2.843** 
SD of landholding  -0.14  1.179 
Ethnic hety*SD of land  0.11  6.262** 
State fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.18  
F-stat 20.00**   
N 123   
 
Note: ‘*’ denotes significance at 5% while ‘**’ denotes that at 1% or lower level. 
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Table 6. Probit maximum likelihood estimates of location choice of a private school 
 









effects  T-stat 









































State fixed effects   Yes     Yes     
Log-L -1603.077     -1618.697     
Chi-sq 662.4286**     631.1889     
N 123     123     
 
Note: Village infrastructural index is a composite index of the village’s access to piped 
water, electricity, phone and post office. We use predicted value of the variable using 
estimates presented in Table A1. ‘*’ denotes significance at 5% while ‘**’ denotes that at 
1% or lower level.   
 
 




Univariate probit  
(2)  
Simultaneous probit [1] 
(3)  
Bivariate probit [1] 
Variables Coefficient T-statistic  Coefficient T-statistic  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Child is a male  -0.30  -3.656**  ‐0.176 ‐ 1.7†  -0.30 -3.490** 
Child> 10 years   -0.04  0.822  ‐0.011 ‐ 0.22  -0.07 1.438 
Proportion of male 
<18 years  0.004  1.091  ‐0.226 ‐ 0.86  0.004 0.066 
Proportion of female < 
18 years  -0.52  -2.360*  ‐0.745 ‐3.31** -0.51 -2.273* 
Male*proportion of 
young female <18 yrs  0.51  2.351*  0.678  2.00*  0.51 2.265* 
Mother’s education  0.05  6.843**  0.049  5.51**  0.05 6.648** 
Father’s education  -0.001  -1.406  0.0196  3.34**  -0.001 -1.305 
Muslim -0.32  -3.332**  ‐0.221 ‐ 2.26*  -0.32 -3.182** 
Pupil teacher ratio in 
the state school  -0.01  -7.672**  0.009  2.76**  -0.01 -6.932** 
% of teacher present  
in the state school   0.12  5.764**  ‐1.947 ‐ 5.5**  0.12 1.613 
No. of infrastructural 
facilities in the state 
school -0.10 -4.963** 0.040  1.31  -0.10 -4.555** 
Village infrastructure 
(predicted) 1.92  8.248** 0.305  2.76**  1.91 7.688** 
State  fixed  effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
RHO(1,2) -    0.04  1.810†  0.05  1.802† 
Log  L  -1857.735  -4203.042  -4459.689  
LR  153.1138       
N  4461  4461  4461  
 
Note: ‘*’ denotes significance at 5% while ‘**’ denotes that at 1% or lower level. ‘†’ 
denotes significance at 10% level. 
[1] Simultaneous and bivariate probit estimates correct for the possibility of ever-
enrolment. 
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Table 8. Estimates of private school presence on class V pass rates  
 
  Govt. school pass rates  Village pass rates  
(Govt & private school)  
Variables   (1) OLS  (2) 2SLS  (3) OLS  (4) 2SLS 


















Intercept  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State control  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2  0.44 0.28 0.23 0.13 
F-stat  4.63** 5.59** 46.82**  13.49** 
N  123 123 123 123 
 
Note: ‘**’ denotes the level of significance at 1% or lower level.  
Class V pass rate is defined as the percentage of total students in class 5 passing the 





Table A1. Probit estimates of Ever-enrolment 
 
Probability of ever enrolment 
Marginal effects 
Variable Coefficient  T-stat  ME  T-stat 
MALE 0.37  8.98**  0.13  9.00** 
10<AGE<=16 0.98 21.03** 0.32  24.48** 
Mother’s edn  0.02  3.17**  0.01  3.18** 
Father’s edn  0.04  8.53**  0.02  8.55** 
MUSLIM -0.19  -2.76**  -0.07  -2.69* 
State control  Yes  Yes 
Log L  -2464.59 
Chi sq  656.57 
 
Note: ‘*’ denotes significance at 5% while ‘**’ denotes that at 1% or lower level.  
 
 
 
 